With the zeal of the newly converted, he defended the validity of the senses, rejecting Skeptical reproaches because of the strictly pathological realms of their arguments: drunkenness, insanity, mystical ecstasy, etc. are hardly normal states, and in the average situation the senses are perfectly adequate. Even the likeness between certain objects is no obstacle, the senses being amenable to training: no mother would ever be in doubt about the distinctiveness of her twins. Some peasants have been known to identify, by glancing at an egg the hen who laid it. Since the sense impressions are essential for establishing notions, and since these are the foundation of all arts and sciences, the Skeptics, by refuting the senses, destroy the possibility of living, and alienate man from his natural purposes.

             Even though none of these arguments were new, they must have been the most complete and systematic catalogue brought forth so far (Goedeckemeyer, p.111). Under their impact, Philo was forced to modify his strict view of probability to a milder one. He defended the Skeptical elements in the old philosophers, and added Stilpo, Diodorus, the Cyrenaics and even Chrysippus to the list. Against the senses, he pointed out that they couldn't be all that perfect if they had to be supported by art, science and training, and that even under perfectly normal conditions bronze statues and seals remain indistinguishable. And failing once, they are untrustworthy for all other purposes. Also, the sorites cannot be destroyed by calling them silly or immoral, but only by disproving them.

             As for the probable, he underlined that it was not only sufficient for living, but that it was de facto used as a criterion also by the Stoics. The Skeptics, far from disavowing the existence of truth, only refuse to acknowledge the possibility of its apprehension. Abstaining from rash assent was still the best attitude for the wise man in matters not readily discernable, and even Panaitios had refused to endorse an important dogma of his school, namely divination. Compiling with more systematic care than anybody before him arguments from all schools and times, he concluded against Antiochus that certainty had not been gained so far in any aspect of philosophy. Epoché was still as necessary as ever, all of the conflicting positions being of equal strength.

             The accusation that the New Academy since Arcesilaus wrongly claimed to be the continuation of the Old Academy, he countered with the argument that Plato was in his opinion a Skeptic. Important evidence was Plato's method of exploring problems under all possible aspects without ever advancing a firm solution. Even in the question of knowing versus opining there was hardly any difference between the two Academies, the younger one being the rightful successor of the older. Antiochus' attempt to reconcile Stoicism with the Peripatos and Plato's Academy he regarded as totally unjustified. But he added that he was open to convincing arguments, and should they be produced, he might abandon his Academic affiliation to become a Stoic himself.

             Antiochus was furious (Cicero, Acad. II, 4, 11) and accused Philo in his Sosus to have changed direction in an unacceptable way. Philo countered sharply, reaffirming his Academic position. He underlined that the quest for truth in the multifaceted Academic way was in itself of value, and far removed from dogmatic intolerance. Any position should never be fanatically defended, but be abandoned in good grace whenever proven unlikely.

             The main concern of Philo's philosophy is ethics. Important related issues in natural philosophy, like the existence and direction of the world, the essence of human nature and particularly the soul, he discarded as being impenetrable. Establishing a parallel between philosophy and medicine, that became important later on with the tradition of Sextus Empiricus, but had apparently been introduced by older philosophers, as for instance Chrysippus, Philo gives ethics a practical and psychological turn reminiscent of Socrates (Goedeckemeyer, p.126).

             Stobeus (Eclog. II, 40 ff.) has preserved the resume of an untitled moral treatise in six parts which is attributed to Philo. The first is an exhortation to lead a virtuous life (protreptikon); the second lists remedies against bad and good influences on the soul (therapeuticon); the third sees happiness as the goal of philosophy, using the medical metaphors of mental and psychological health; the fourth prescribes means to preserve this health in the way of living (peri bion) and is divided into two parts, the second of which counts for a separate (the fifth) division because of its importance. The first deals with particular concerns, such as whether the wise man should marry; the second of more general import, such as the foundation and administration of states. Finally, considering the lack of wisdom predominant among the masses, and due to their lack of leisure to philosophize and to develop idle theoretical viewpoints, a sixth part outlines in brief handbook form precepts (hypothetikos logos) for all sorts of situations.

             Brochard (p.207) finds a reflection of this "excellent" moral writing in Cicero's De officiis, and, obviously fond of Philo, he defines his wisdom as less "farouche" than Pascal's and yet firmer than Montaigne's. Although Brochard does not mention Montaigne explicitly, he paraphrases a well known saying of his with these words: "Il (Philo) n'estime pas ... que l'ignorance et l'incuriosité soient deux oreillers pour une tête bien faite" (see for comparison Montaigne, III, 13, p.1073).

             Especially, Philo's consideration for the masses, contrasting so sharply with the Stoic distaste for the common man, seems endearing. Brochard considers Philo to be one of many representatives of several Skeptical Academicians mistreated or neglected by the history of philosophy, and described in the following way: "Esprits déliés et subtils, éloquents sans affectation et ennemies de tout pédantisme, ouverts à toutes les idées justes sans être dupes des mots, sûrs dans leurs amitiés, les nouveaux académiciens furent les plus aimables de tous les philosphes" (p.208). With Philo, the New Academy comes to an end, Antiochus giving it a decisive turn towards the eclecticism which links it to Neo-platonism.

Cicero (106-43 B.C.)

             According to Goedeckemeyer (p.201), Cicero is the last blossom of Academic Skepticism, and in agreement with this opinion, he dedicates roughly seventy pages to him. Considering Cicero's eclectic position, such a treatment seems somewhat exaggerated. The detailed profile does not give any convincing justification for Cicero's prominent position in a history of Greek skepticism. In many, if not all, essential points Cicero appears closer to Stoicism, Platonism, and the Peripatos.

             Cicero wrote his philosophical works late in life during more of less involuntary political retirement. They reflect the extensive philosophical education he received as a young man. The Epicurean Phaedrus had an early influence on him, but Philo's teaching in Rome made a more decisive impression, and Cicero always considered himself an Academician. On Philo's advice, he became acquainted with other major schools of philosophy. He studied dialectics with the Stoic Diodorus, and during his 78-77 educational journey to Greece and Asia Minor, he met in Rhodus (where he wanted to hear the famous rhetorician Apollodorus Mola) one of the most eminent Stoics, Posidonius. In Athens, he heard his former teacher as well as the Epicurean Zeno, Phaedrus, Antiochus, and perfected his rhetorical skills with the help of a certain Demetrius.

             When he returned to Rome, he became Quaestor (76 B.C.), and his subsequent political career left him, with the exception of the short interruption of his exile in 58-57, little time for philosophical studies beyond mere reading. Greatly affected by the death of his daughter Tullia in February of 45 B.C., he retired to his country domain in Asturia, where he wrote in quick succession a Consolatio, the Hortensius, and the two versions of the Academica. In 44, he produced five books on the highest goods and evils (De finibus bonorum et malorum), five books of Tusculanae disputationes, three on the gods (De natura deorum), two on divination (De divinatione), a discussion of old age (De senectute), one about fate (De fato), one on friendship (Laelius), two on glory (De honoribus), and finally three on duty (De officiis).

             After Caesar's murder (March, 44) he had hoped in vain for a renewal of the Republic. Most of 43 B.C. he was leader of the Senate, in strong opposition to Marcus Antonius, who had him murdered in December of that year.

             Cicero's own writings are the principal source for his philosophical evaluation. All closely follow Greek predecessors, but not without critical selection and comment, and all are displaying a particularly accomplished form.

             In the Academica, where he defends the skeptical position of the New Academy against Lucullus' viewpoint (based on Antiochus) and in the Tusculanae Disputationes, Cicero most clearly reflects Academic skepticism. According to Hirzel (III, p.314, 479), Philo is the main source for both these treatises, but Goedeckemeyer (p.146) considers Clitomachos' influence equally important, and for this reason sees him advocating the more severe form of Skepticism.

             The centre of Cicero's philosophy is the search for happiness and truth, but for the practical aspects of life the probable is much emphasized. Like Philo, he considers the Old Academy, including Socrates, as a predecessor of the New Academy, and he is particularly fond of the Socratic goal of self-knowledge.

             However, in his ontological viewpoint he closely follows the Stoic opinion of a harmonious universe reflecting the benevolent intentions of a superior reason. Consequently, his pantheistic theology and his anthropocentric conception of man clearly bear resemblance to Stoic ideas, but with the exclusion of fatality and divination. Further influence of a milder stoicism represented by Panaitios and Posidonius can be observed in the identification of virtu with the summum bonum, and turpe (or brutishness) with the summum malum.  Man is naturally good, but this characteristic is implanted like a seed needing appropriate conditions to develop its potential in the best possible way. Often it is crippled by wrong education or detrimental experience. But since man is endowed with free will, he can and has to strive towards the fulfillment of his innate qualities.

             The fundamental dualism in Cicero's conception of the world (the supralunar realm is ethereal, perfect, and eternal, the sublunar region, although beautiful and balanced in many ways, is material, has flaws, and is subject to decay) and of man (the soul reflects the qualities of supralunar essence, the body those of sublunar characteristics) is in its spiritual tendency modelled after Platonic doctrines. In particular, Cicero's theory of learning and of the soul suggests this affinity. The astounding ability to learn and to remember can, in his opinion, only be explained by the recollection of a knowledge prior to one's existence. He sees in the soul the only element in the sublunar region to escape decomposition, because its reasonable part, being specifically human, is of divine origin. Whereas discussions about its nature - be it fiery, airy, liquid, ethereal or otherwise - and its location are of no concern to him, he believes in its special status, so that death means nothing else but a deliverance from earthly bounds. In other words, he is convinced of the immortality of the soul and of a better life after death.

             Life is seen in a rather gloomy light: for most of us it is nothing but never-ending plight and pain; it is the exile from our original and perfect domain; it is a cumbersome journey towards a safe haven. The ancient philosophers were right when they considered it a punishment to live, and believed it best not to be born at all, second best to die as fast as possible. However, it is not permissable to escape cowardly by committing suicide. Everything has to be supported with courage and only with explicit invitation by the divinities may one exit life (Tusc. II, 27, 66ff.), as for instance in case of unbearable pain.

             The reasonable part of the soul is identified with virtue. Its role is to master the unreasonable part, which manifests itself in passions and affects, and, when out of control, represents sheer brutishness (turpe). Since happiness depends on virtue, we can be in command of it by eradicating evil with the suppression of demeaning emotions.

             Although this stern emphasis on virtue seems at first glance entirely stoic, Cicero really agrees with the Academic and Peripatetic position in granting importance to a certain degree of physical well-being and even favourable external circumstances. But then for him, there is no contradiction with the Stoic doctrine, since the differences do not lie in unreconcilable opinions, but rather in a quibbling over words. Also, in the practical application of his moral principles he advocates a road accessible to all, reminiscent of the Peripatetic rule of the golden mean already supported by Carneades and Philo, but also by the Stoic Panaitius. To be just, to be charitable and clement, to be moderate, not to harm anybody,including slaves, to be courageous, those are the norms to obey.

             In agreement with his own practice in life, Cicero stresses participation in state affairs for the well being of the social organism. Among the social duties to be observed are religion (without superstition), the fatherland, and one's parents. Rhetoric has a prominent position in his philosophy, since it is useful in political enterprises as well as moral education. He sees it closely related to the Academic method to argue pro and contra any argument in an objective way. The aspect of duty seems to be inspired by Panaitius (Bieler, p.121) and adapted to Roman circumstances, but the pronounced conservative tendency may be considered a skeptical component.

             Zeller (Grundriss, p.247) sees Cicero's affiliation with the Skeptical Academy in a purely formal light, lying in the Academic method of argumentation. Whatever doubt there is found in Cicero can be related to general confusion due to the many conflicting opinions advanced by the major philosophical schools. He denies any originality on Cicero's part, and considers Stoic dignity, laced with Platonic spirituality, to be the predominant element.

             This opinion is more convincing than Hirzel's, who tries to present Cicero as a firmer Skeptic than he really is by minimizing the spiritual tendencies, and Goedeckemeyer's who does not agree with Hirzel on this point, but who grants Cicero a prominent place in the history of skepticism. Bieler (p.118) states that Cicero's philosophical works had little impact on his contemporaries, who were for the most part well acquainted with Greek philosophy themselves. The Patristic and Renaissance, however, drew heavily on these writings, so that Cicero does have an important position in the history of ideas as a mediator of Skepticism (Popkin, Skept., p.451).

Aenesidemus (ca. 50 B.C.-10 A.D.)

             With Aenesidemus, Skepticism enters a new phase. Although only remnants of his work have survived through a summary in Photius, paraphrases in Sextus, or discussions in Tertullian and Diogenes Laertius, his philosophical opinions are relatively well known. Biographical information about him is, unfortunately, almost nonexistent. As Brochard points out, any date between 80 B.C. and 130 A.D. has been proposed for the height of his activity. Like many others, Brochard sees him as a contemporary of Philo of Larissa, Antiochus of Ascalon and the young Cicero in the eighties or seventies of the first century B.C.

             Goedeckemeyer (p.211) advances quite convincingly that he was influential during the second half of that century, from the low forties to the late twenties. He offers the most elaborate network of cross-references ranging form Philo Judaeus (30 B.C. - 50 A.D.) to Photius (9th century A.D.) and concludes that Aenesidemus' Pyrrhoneioi logoi in eight volumes, dedicated to his friend and fellow-student in the New Academy, L. Tubero, must have appeared shortly before or after Cicero's death in 43 B.C. Cicero, who was also a friend of L. Tubero, and roughly of the same age, does not seem to have known Aenesidemus' works. Aenesidemus' reproach that certain representatives of the New Academy were almost entirely Stoic might not have been aimed at Philo, but his disciples Eudorus or Arius Didymus, and perhaps even Cicero (Goedeckemeyer, p.211, n.1).

             It is known that Aenesidemus came from Knossos in Crete and taught in Alexandria (DL IX, 116). According to Diogenes Laertius (ibid.), a Pyrrhonian trend of Skepticism was extant there at that time, and a certain Heraclides (of Erythrea ?) seems to have been Aenesidemus' teacher. He also must have been closely associated with the mitigated skepticism of the New Academy. The Pyrrhonian sentences were apparently meant to explain and justify to his fellow student Tubero why he rejected the Academy and adopted Pyrrhonian Skeptical principles. All eight books are summarized in Photius (Cod. 212).

             In the first, Aenesidemus accuses the New Academicians of dogmatizing along the lines of Stoicism in distinguishing between good and bad, true and false, wisdom and folly, and just stopping short of accepting the phantasia kataleptike. The Pyrrhonians, in contrast, are not affirming or denying anything. Since nothing has yet been established with certainty, suspension of judgement is indicated as outlined in the Pyrrhonian doctrine or rather direction (agoge). The second book treats causality, movement, generation and destruction; the third, sensations and thought; the fourth, signs and ontology (nature, the world, the gods). The fifth presents the eight tropes of etiology, showing that causes are unknowable. The sixth deals with good and evil, the seventh with virtues. The eighth book demonstrates that neither happiness, nor pleasure, nor wisdom can be the ultimate goal (summum bonum), and that there is nothing man could postulate as final objective (Brochard. p.248-249).

             The famous ten tropes (or topoi, logoi; Brochard, p.254) enumerated in Diogenes Laertius (IX, 78; 87) and, less reliably, in Sextus Empiricus (P I, 36-163) constitute a methodological catalogue of Skeptical arguments against certainty, be it of a sensible, rational or scientific nature, and are meant to lead as a logical consequence to the suspension of judgement. They stem from Aenesidemus' Hypotyposis eis ta Pyrrhoneia (DL, IX, 78; Aristocles, Eus. XIV, 18,11), and may be either the title (Haas) or part of the Pyrrhoneioi logoi (Ritter), or an independent treatise (Zeller; Saisset). Certain things produce in us similar effects, so that they seem certain because of their habitual occurrence. However, the opposite beliefs are just as founded as the ones we tend to believe in. Distinguishing between them is impossible, since they carry equal weight.

             The first trope points out that animals (including man) are born and equipped in different ways, and that therefore perceptions are quite varied. For instance, the sense of touch differs with the surface of skin, feather, scale or shell. There is no reason to believe that human perception is superior to that of the animals', it being impossible to decide whose senses capture reality more adequately.

             The second trope deals with the differences among the physical and mental constitution of man. How can one chose a valid criterion? The consensus of the majority is impractical, since it can never be determined in a satisfactory way due to the inexhaustible dimension of time and space.

             The third trope addresses the diversity in human perception. A painting seems to reflect a relief to the eye, yet the touch reveals no prominence. Perfume smells good, but tastes bad. An apple could have qualities not detected by the human sensual apparatus, just as a blind man cannot conceive of colours.

             The fourth trope points out that perception varies with situational factors: depending on whether he is awake or asleep, drunk or sober, healthy or diseased, young or old, resting or moving, man sees things in a different light. Love sees beauty where there isn't any, and who could decide which among so many conflicting ideas corresponds to reality?

             The fifth trope deals with changes in perception because of spatial considerations. A ship, small at a distance, appears big from close by; a tower seems square from far away, and round in proximity. The neck of a dove changes colour depending on its position.

             The sixth trope addresses mixtures: perception comes about globally, so that light, temperature, movement may modify the object observed. The facial colour, for instance, varies with hot or cold air, age, and health. The voice is susceptible to changes due to strain, temperature and colds. The colour purple adopts a different shade in the sun than in candle light. Man cannot distinguish what really is any better than he can detect oil in a well blended cream.

             The seventh trope points out that quantity can change the aspect of objects. Examples are the horn of the goat (usually black, it appears white when shaved), sand (while individual grains are hard, it feels soft in large quantities), and wine (salutary in moderate amounts, it becomes debilitating when enjoyed in excess).

             The eighth trope deals with relation: everything appears in relation to something else, and to the perception of somebody. Right and left, big and small, high and low, are meaningless without a specific context and a perceiving subject. The same applies to notions like father and son. Therefore, nothing is known in itself, all things being relative to our mind.

             The ninth trope maintains that frequency affects our outlook: the sun does not seem amazing because we are used to its regular appearance. A comet, being considerably smaller, but rare and unexpected, has a much greater impact. Catastrophes like earthquakes are especially frightening when experienced for the first time, but frequent repetitions will build up the dulling effect of habit.

             The tenth trope insists on the relativity of human customs, laws and opinions. The Egyptians embalm their dead, the Romans burn them, the Paeonians throw them into lakes (DL IX, 84). The Persians allow marriage between father and daughter, the Greeks do not. On the subject of beauty, justice, religion, and existence different countries advance a never-ending stream of different views, all believed to be true in a given society at a given time. Since it is impossible to decide in favour of any of them, suspension of judgement is the only solution.

             The number and the order of the ten tropes is lengthily debated by the critics and is rather confusing. As outlined above, they appear in Sextus Empiricus (PI , 36-163). Diogenes Laertius (IX, 78-88), following either Favorinus or Theodosius, has a more logical grouping in Brochard's (p.260) opinion: the first four and the tenth are related to the subject; tropes five, six, seven and nine, to the object, and the eighth trope provides a link between subject and object.

             To the insufficiency of the senses, Aenesidemus adds the refutation of science. By mind boggling logical summersaults inspired by Megarian dialectics (Goedeckemeyer, p.222), he proves that neither truth, nor causes nor signs can exist. Brochard (p.290ff) expresses a similar confusion we have experienced: he feels that Aenesidemus' argumentation is chameleon-like: "Si on consulte le bon sens, si on voit où l'on va, on resiste énergiquement; si on considère les raisons invoquées, elles sont claires, simples, irréprochablement enchaînées: on hesite, on est inquiet; on se demande si ce n'est pas le bon sens qui a tort et le sceptique qui a raison. Tour à tout, ... l'argumentation paraît irrésistible ou ridicule". He concludes that for Aenesidemus the relation between existence and perception is analytic, whereas "for us" , it is synthetic.

             Against any dogmatic theory of cause and effect, Aenesidemus advances eight tropes of etiology. Brochard (p.266) calls them a list of sophisms, and enumerates with them the concrete examples from natural philosophy assembled by Sextus' editor Fabricius (1718). In Sextus Empiricus (PI, 180-185), Aenesidemus' etiological tropes read like this: "... the First ... shows that, since aetiology as a whole deals with the non-apparent, it is unconfirmed by any agreed evidence from appearances. The Second Mode shows how often, when there is ample scope for ascribing the object of investigation to a variety of causes, some of them (the dogmatics, G.D.) account for it in one way only. The Third shows how to orderly events they assign causes which exhibit no order. The Fourth shows how, when they have grasped the way in which appearances occur, they assume that they have also apprehended how non-apparent things occur ... In the Fifth Mode it is shown how practically all these theorists assign causes according to their own particular hypotheses ... In the Sixth it is shown how they frequently admit only such facts as can be explained by their own theories, and dismiss facts which conflict therewith though possessing equal probability. The Seventh shows how they often assign causes which conflict not only with appearances but also with their own hypotheses. The Eighth shows that often, when there is equal doubt about things seemingly apparent and things under investigation, they base their doctrine ... upon things equally doubtful". Furthermore, mistakes related to a mixture of the above points have been observed.

             Having thus denounced the theory and practice of causality and induction, he attacks the theory of signs. According to the Stoics, phenomena are interpreted by reason as effects of causes, and can therefore be seen as signs. Aenesidemus points out that these effects or signs are frequently interpreted in contradictory ways. Symptoms of fever, such as a high temperature, sweat, a speedy pulse also lead to different conclusions amongst physicians: one sees them as an indication of strong blood, another of high tension, etc. If the signs were perceptible or intelligible, they would be as obvious as whiteness, appearing in like manner to everybody in good health.

             In ethics, Aenesidemus seems to have given some emphasis to pleasures (hedone), but Brochard (p.271) believes that this term is meant in a very large sense including perhaps ataraxia (as for Epicure) or eudaimonia (as for Pyrrho). On the whole, he followed closely the old Pyrrhonian line. Stating that the highest good is inexistant, he hasten to add that this is only seemingly an affirmation. It is not a dogma but a subjective opinion, misleading only by the constraints of language, which is naturally dogmatic and lends itself to the expression of Skeptical viewpoints in very unsatisfactory ways (Photius, 170a 12, in Goedeckemeyer, p.228).

             Much discussion revolves around the question whether Aenesidemus did or did not embrace Heraclitus' doctrines, as certain textual indications suggest. Some, like Natorp, Saisset, Zeller and Diels cannot accept this view, in seemingly blatant contradiction with Aenesidemus' skepticism. Others, like Brochard (p.284) and Goedeckemeyer (p.229), agree that he must have changed direction twice: from the diluted Skepticism of the New Academy he turned to radical, Pyrrhonian Skepticism, and ended up with a negative-dogmatic position in the wake of Heraclitus.

             Brochard (p.285) sees in this last turn an understandable psychological development, especially, since Aenesidemus is known to have declared that Pyrrhonism is the road leading to Heraclitism. First, Aenesidemus doubts and sees opposites in a balance not allowing any judgement. But, since the mind is always looking for answers, he does not find this position acceptable for long, and discovers in Heraclitus a satisfactory explanation for both doubt and opposites.

             There is great affinity between Heraclitus' view of the flux of things and Aenesidemus' intuition of an ever-changing world of appearances. As for the opposites, he turns from believing that things are "neither this nor that" (ou mallon) or an "absolute-relativistic position" (Goedeckemeyer, p.214) to Heraclitus' opinion that they really are the same in their extremes, or to the coincidentia oppositorum later exploited by Nicholas Cusanus and Nietzsche (Philosophisches Wörterbuch).

             Affirming the oneness of opposites obviously goes beyond mere appearances and resembles a metaphysical dogma. So does the postulation of air, number, and time as first principles, all being identical with unity. This first principle is material, and also is the source of all existence, or, as Brochard (p.273) amplifies his source of information (SE, M IX, 337): "... malgré la diversité des apparences, c'est la même essence qu'on retrouve au fond de toute chose, et grâce à cette communauté d'essence, on peut dire que le tout est identique à chaque partie, et chaque partie identique au tout". Goedeckemeyer (p.232) points out that while Aenesidemus believes to adopt Heraclitus' ideas, he really sees him through stoical spectacles, and that his dogmatic viewpoints reflect the "Kompromiß-Philosophie" characteristic of his age. Like the New Academicians, trying to reconcile in good faith Stoicism with their philosophy, Aenesidemus is possibly quite unaware of blending Stoic, Peripatetic and Neo-pythagoreic (p.234) components with predominantly Heraclitean elements.

             In agreement with the fundamental theses of perpetual change and all-transcending unity, he sees the soul like Heraclitus, but also like Strato, as the place where both perception (sensual) and thought (rational) take place. Goedeckemeyer (p.235) calls him therefore an advocate of a monism of the soul ("Anhänger der Einheit der Seele"). Similarly, his conception of common notions (our present-day universals?) is a mixture of Heraclitean and Stoic ideas: seeing the universal agreement on certain ideas, he relates them to an omnipresent reason, and accepts them as a criterion for truth: phenomena common to all humans are true, those particular to individuals are not (Brochard, p.275). Natorp (p.117) and Goedeckemeyer (p.231) insist, however, that "truth" in Aenesidemus' usage really is the equivalent of probability.

             Brochard (p.288) sees the dogma of common notions and the conception of the soul as the logical consequences of Aenesidemus' fundamental monistic position, and he maintains that Aenesidemus "... en se ralliant au dogmatisme héraclitéen ... n'abandonne aucune des thèses qu'il avait précédemment soutenues". Things in themselves, meaning a reality independent from its context and a conscious mind, remain unknowable; causes and demonstrations are equally uncertain, and still nothing can be advanced with certainty.

             Brochard (p.286, like Natorp, p.84, 293, and Hirzel, III p.64ff.) compares Aenesidemus to Protagoras who, in his opinion, is a dogmatic Skeptic because he accepts the coexistence of as many individually restricted worlds as there are minds. He furthermore defends Aenesidemus' dogmatic turn by considering it stronger, more open and honest than the Pyrrhonian position (p.287). In fact, Brochard accuses the Pyrrhonians of "lip service" since they claim that they do not know anything whereas they really are quite sure they do not and cannot know. He also considers them hypocritical, anxious to save appearances and not to shock generally accepted values. Their attitude "est une sorte de pis-aller". Firmly admitting, like Protagoras and Aenesidemus, that truth cannot be known in principle seems to him a more satisfactory declaration in spite of the negative-dogmatic overtones. He also insinuates (p.288) that subsequent Skeptics counted Aenesidemus among their ranks in spite of his defection, and that they understood his motives well.

             Both Brochard (p.297) and Goedeckemeyer (p.235) assign to Aenesidemus a transitional role, seeing him in complete agreement with neither the Academic nor the strictly Pyrrhonian direction of Skepticism, nor with the later trend of empirical investigation. His concern to find a metaphysical system and his dialectical argumentation are decisive in their opinion. Brochard (p.298, 2) points out that the Empiricists have a more material orientation and concentrate on purely practical concerns. He compares them to modern time Positivists, like Auguste Comte, whereas Aenesidemus, still preoccupied with metaphysics, resembles Kant. Even though Aenesidemus opened up the possibility of scientific investigation by saying that nothing had been proven true so far instead of affirming everlasting and unchanging darkness, he himself did not have any scientific inclinations. His later successors, however, continued precisely in this direction, and to the detriment of metaphysical concerns.

             Aenesidemus' followers seem to have adhered to his Pyrrhonian direction. Listed in Diogenes Laertius (IX, 106) are Zeuxis of Tarent and Antiochus of Laodicea. Goedeckemeyer (p.237) adds Apollonides of Nicaea who dedicated a commentary on Timon's Silles to Tiberius, and seems to have revived an historical interest in Pyrrhonian origins.

Agrippa (ca. 100 A.D.)

             Agrippa, probably a young contemporary of those mentioned above, is not named in Diogenes Laertius' list of Neo-pyrrhonian leaders, and also Sextus Empiricus does not mention him at all. Nothing much is known of him, but he must have lived at the end of the first century A.D. He added five tropes of logical importance to Aenesidemus' ten. They were meant to uproot any kind of dogmatic belief: the first is the general disagreement of opinions; the second is the regressum ad infinitum; the third points out subjective and objective relativity; the fourth sees in any hypothesis an a priori assumption, and the fifth is the diallelus, or circular argument. With these weapons he attacked individual dogmatic theories like those of the criterion, the sign, the causes and movement, and also denied that anything can be taught (DL IX, 100). In his argumentation he displayed considerable historical knowledge and polemic inclination (Goedeckemeyer, p.243).

             Unlike Aenesidemus, Agrippa excludes the very possibility of attaining truth, and sees in the phenomena sufficient guidance for living. Reason is inadequate, so that there is logically no road to certitude. Brochard sees in Aenesidemus a dialectician, in Agrippa a logician. He points out (p.306) that modern Skeptics still draw on these five tropes he describes as "irresistible" and as "la formule la plus radicale et la plus précise qu'on ait jamais donnée au skepticisme".

Favorinus (ca. 80-150 A.D.)

             Less important but better known than Agrippa, Favorinus, who was predominantly a rhetorician and politician, had pronounced Skeptical leanings. Born around 80 A.D. in Arles (Arleate), he lived in Rome and received his rhetorical education under Dion Chrysostom (ca. 40-120), who had loose connections with Cynicism. During an extended stay in Athens (ca. 106), he met with the Cynic Demonax, the Academician Herodes Atticus and, most importantly, Plutarch (ca. 45-125) who had a lasting influence on him (Goedeckemeyer, p.249).

             Although there is some debate about whether his Skepticism was Academic or Pyrrhonian, it seems that to Favorinus' mind, there was not much difference between the two trends. He used arguments familiar to both, such as relativity, differences in opinions, the ten tropes, and he advocated probability like Carneades. Successful, rich, popular and befriended by Epictetus (60-138) and Hadrian (76-138), he led a privileged life until his death.

             Brochard (p.328) mentions that he was not much respected by contemporary philosophers. Lucian (ca. 125-180) draws a satirical picture of him, suggesting that because of his high voice and effeminate behaviour he must have been a hermaphrodite or eunuch. Galen mocks his method of eloquently defending at least two sides of any subject. His disciple Aulus Gellius, on the other hand, remembers him fondly all his life in his Attic nights. Plutarch also thought highly of him, and devoted De primo frigido to him.

             Goedeckemeyer (p.256) accuses him of calculated mass-appeal and greed. Apparently, he defended notoriously immoral clients to increase his fame and fortune, so that the judgement of a well educated sophist or at most a popularizing philosopher seems justified. Whatever Academic Skepticism there remained at that time was totally extinguished with him.

Menodotus (ca. 150 A.D.)

             With Menodotus who according to Brochard (p.310) lived around 150 A.D. in Alexandria, the fusion between Neo-pyrrhonian Skepticism and medical Empiricism takes place. Already his predecessor and teacher, Antiochus of Laodicea, was presumably a physician, but Menodotus combined the leadership of the Empirical medical school with the direction of Pyrrhonian Skepticism. According to Goedeckemeyer (p.258), he reduced Agrippa's five tropes to two of relativity, stating that nothing can be comprehended by itself, nor by any other means. He wrote several treatises, and was important enough to be attacked by Galen, who seems to have followed one of Menodotus' works in De subfiguratione empirica (Brochard, p.312). Apparently, he dedicated one of his efforts to Septimus Severus, advocated the arts and sciences in the specifically Skeptical understanding of these concepts, and forgot about any Skeptical reserve in bluntly calling the theories of the famous physician Asklepiades incorrect.

             Galen (De subf. emp., 63) draws an unpleasant picture of him, accusing him of seeing in medical practice only a means to become rich and famous. His temper was quick and his tongue sharp, insulting his medical or philosophical opponents so readily that Galen compared him to a barking dog. Through his polemic verve he reminds Brochard (p.312) of Timon.

             In scientific methodology, Menodotus follows a purely phenomenological line: he attacks medical dogmatism and the questionable researching of causes, adopting a position of negative dogmatism himself in affirming the impossibility of knowledge per se. He distinguishes the endeiktic sign from the hypomnetic sign, rejecting the former as dogmatic, since it infers causal relations. The latter is acceptable, since it only remembers previously noted observations.

             Science in the empirical sense relies on the succession and coexistence of phenomena, and frequency plays as important a role as regularity. Instead of definitions based on a priori assumptions, a complex of symptoms founded on observation and experience leads to an understanding of the phenomena and provides a practical guideline to similar appearances. These allow the compilation of instructive sentences or theorems recording past experience for the use of future analogous cases (Goedeckemeyer, p.259-61).

             Menodotus' contemporary and successor Theodas of Laodicea also attracted Galen's scorn. Two works are known by him, an Introduction (Eisagoge) and the Main Principles (Kephalaia), where he ascribed three parts to medicine: signativa, curativa, and sanativa. The bases of medical knowledge are observation (teresis, a term introduced by him), experience including historical tradition, and analogy. In addition, the use of reason is accepted and opposed to the simple and mindless heaping of observational data (Brochard, p.211).

             A younger follower of the same generation, Theodosius, wrote a commentary on Theodas' Kephhalaia (mentioned in Suidas), of which "not a syllable subsists" (Goedeckemeyer, p.264, transl. g.d.). Unlike Menodotus, who fiercely opposed any reconciling tendencies, Theodosius accepted Homer, the seven wise men, Euripides, Xenophanes, Zeno, Democritus, Plato, Empedocles, Heraclitus and Hippocrates (DL, IX, 71ff.) as precursors of Pyrrhonian Skepticism. This attempt to reconcile ancient elements with his position is the exact parallel to attempts on the Neo-academic side, as witnessed in Cicero's Academica and in Plutarch (Adv. Colotes, 26,2).

             With Herodotus of Tarsus, the master of Sextus Empiricus (DL IX, 116), the skeptical school moved from Alexandria to Rome, say Haas (p.14) and Sepp (p.88), to "the East" believe Pappenheim (Lebensv., p.48ff.) and Goedeckemeyer (p.265). If he was the famous physician mentioned in Galen (Bk. Viii, 751) and lived in Rome under Trajan (98-117 A.D.), as Sepp (p.121) speculates, he could hardly have been Sextus' teacher, since Sextus' dates are fairly unanimously placed in the second half of the second century.

Sextus Empiricus (ca. 150-210 A.D.)

             Next to nothing is known about the life of this man, to whom we owe the most important and complete source of ancient Skepticism.

             Since he often refers to "we" and "us" in the context of Greek customs, it is assumed that he was of Greek origin. He seems to have been to Alexandria, Athens and Rome, but lived and taught "where (his) teacher was talking" (P III, 120), probably somewhere in the East. The main argument for Goedeckemeyer's (p..265, n.6) assumption is the Romans' obvious ignorance of Pyrrhonian Skepticism which contrasts with the attention it receives later on by Eastern writers like Gregory of Nazantius, Agathias and Georgius who refute Sextus and Skepticism as dangerous in much the same way as Saint Augustine opposes Cicero's Academic Skepticism (Goedeckemeyer, p.331).

             Sepp, who has a pronounced tendency to detect Skepticism in almost anybody anywhere, believes it to be quite influential in Rome. He even identifies Sextus Empiricus with the teacher of Marcus Aurelius (121-180), a certain Sextus of Chaeronea who along with his illustrious disciple was, in Sepp's opinion, falsely considered a Stoic by Capitolinus (p.86).

             As if this highly speculative connection, not alluded to in any of the other critical works consulted, were not enough, he also finds by means of some complicated mental arithmetic and erroneous information (Brochard, p.316) in the article Sextos in Suidas sufficient reason to link Sextus to the Libyan lawyer Sextus Caecilius Africanus, makes Apuleius his nephew (p.89) and Plutarch his uncle (p.90). The amazing composite picture of the skeptical philosopher is then presented like this (p.90): "Der Lehrer des Mark Aurel und früher des Verus war also nach dem oben Gesagten Arzt, Jurist und Pyrrhonischer Philosoph und heißt Sextus Cäcilius Empirikus aus Chäronea, Africanus (Aibus)."

             We prefer to this highly creative and rather unskeptical statement the wiser admissions of Brochard (p.314), Goedeckemeyer (p.266, n.2), Bury (p.xli) and others, that little else but the approximate time of his life is known. Goedeckemeyer (ibid.) bases it on a system of references in Sextus, Diogenes (ca. 230-250) and Hippolytus (ca. 220-230), as well as on Sextus' remark (P I, 65) that the Stoics of his times are his main opponents. Stoicism, deteriorating rapidly in the third century, could not have played this role had Sextus lived then.

             Goedeckemeyer (p.268) describes him as a successful physician and cultivated philosopher, who proves not only his extensive readings - Timon is the skeptic most often cited - but also his personal philosophical preferences, however subtly and modestly presented. He leads the positivistic tendency established under Menodotus to its fullest accomplishments, and taking back Agrippa's negative-dogmatic touches, returns to the absolute-skeptical viewpoint of Aenesidemus.

             Without being blind to Sextus' stylistic flaws and tiresome, schematic proofs, both Brochard (p.325-326) and Goedeckemeyer (p.268) appreciate his thoroughness, exactitude and systematic approach, and reject the much repeated opinion of Zeller, Haas and Bury that Sextus is nothing but a mindless compiler of the type later represented by Diogenes Laertius.

             His philosophical works have survived almost completely and constitute what Brochard (p.322) calls in analogy to scholasticism the summa of Skepticism. Bury (p.xlii) considers them "immense arsenals stored with all the weapons of offence and defense of every conceivable pattern, old and new, that ever were forged on the anvil of Scepticism". Brochard points out (p.322) that Sextus very truthfully exposes the views of all the main Skeptics, not only or mainly those of Aenesidemus, as Zeller believes. Rarely mentioned by name - neither Agrippa nor Menodotus are referred to, although their doctrines are described at length - their opinions are blended into one collective statement, including the author's own opinions. His impartiality lets him expose the positions and arguments of his opponents with equal precision and they often have great value in their historical evaluation. For instance, his account of Stoic epistemology is so well presented, that one almost forgets the purpose, which is to refute them in the long run. His ideas are usually clear and his style is free of pretensions. Thanks to his writings, Skepticism is the best known philosophy of antiquity: "Nous ne connaissons pas bien les sceptiques, mais, grâce à Sextus, nous pouvons connaître parfaitement le sceptisisme" (Brochard, p.327).

             The Outlines of Pyrrhonism (Pyrrhoneioi hypotyposes) are like a "bréviaire du scepticisme" (Brochard, p.322) in three parts, of which the first establishes Skeptical principles, while the other two refute all kinds of dogmatic theories.

             Of the eleven books probably regrouped after Sextus' times as Pros mathematikos, five (M VII-XI) are an amplification of the Outlines.  Rather than an outline - commentary relation, Goedeckemeyer (p.291) sees in them an application to the theory. The other six parts (M I-VI) examine the individual arts and sciences from a skeptical point of view.

             Existence can be divided into things perceived through the senses and common to all,and things non-evident. The latter are subject to much disagreement. Some affirm to know something about them, and are therefore dogmatics; others, namely the Academics admit that they don't know anything about them, while the Skeptics still attempt to find an answer (P I, 2). Quite expressively, the dogmatics are compared to men shooting in the dark (M VIII, 325), where nobody even knows when he hits a target. Xenophanes already expressed that idea. The firm intention of the Skeptics, being philanthropic, is to cure the dogmatics of their conceit and rashness; for that purpose, and depending on the gravity of the individual case, the remedy will vary in kind and dose (P III, 280).

             The Skeptical tendency is called Pyrrhonian for its origin, zetetic for its search for truth, aporetic for weighing different arguments and ephectic for its refusal to make any decisions (PI, 7). Since there is no criterion evident to all to determine the hidden truth, suspension of judgement is at order.

             The method is to oppose to each opinion one contradicting it, and if there isn't any, to point out the possibility of its future discovery. The Skeptic does not dogmatize, since he remains aware of the purely subjective and relative nature of his statements (P I, 14). Just as he would never deny sense impressions like sweetness and warmth, he does not have to withhold judgement on complex givens, like number, movement, growth and decline, as long as he does not venture beyond the phenomena. Even imaginary concepts are acceptable, if they clearly come about by resemblance to observable facts, such as the giant being an enlarged human, and a centaur a synthesis of horse and man.

             Perception and intelligent observation of the appearances are the main guides of the Skeptic in deciding his actions. Nature (P I, 23ff) in the sense of both biological needs particular the the species and as individual inclination, as well as the customs, laws and religious beliefs of one's country provide further guidance for conduct. The goal, quietude, is quite easily reached by such a moderate, middle-of-the-road approach. It follows naturally the suspension of judgement in all matters metaphysical (P I, 26), whereas the dogmatic must battle for inner peace and is not likely ever to achieve it. The handy form of the ten tropes help the Skeptic to reach epoché in all situations.

             To the Stoic accusation that the Skeptics cannot grasp their metaphysical concepts, Sextus replies with an analysis of grasping: in one sense, and fully acceptable to the Skeptic, it means "imagining"; in another, it has the meaning of "comprehending", and this is impossible not only to the Skeptics, but just as much to the dogmatics who flatter themselves to understand, even though they fight amongst themselves over various assertions of equal absurdity (P II, 9ff).

             Similarly, he takes apart the criterion of truth, dealing first with the criterion, then with truth separately. Three possible means of apprehension could serve as the criterion: one is natural, like the senses; the other is artificial, like a measuring tool; the third is logical. Given the endless disputes raging over each of these possibilities, no conclusive answer can be given.

             The logical means can be seen in three further components, all of them turning out to be just as inadequate: man is the subject of apprehension, the senses and/or reason are the means, and the appearances are the object (M VII, 38-45; P II, 80-84). The notion of man, in order to be the criterion, would have to be satisfactorily defined, which has never been achieved yet; the senses are often contradicting each other, and even more uncertain when compared to different individuals. As for reason, there is already disagreement on its very existence, never mind its essence.

             Since the senses precede any rational operation, there is question about how trustworthy their information is. They well might be like dishonest servants, falsifying or withholding messages meant for their master. Finally, the relation between thing and concept is far from being clear, as proven by the large number of theories on the subject. The stoics believe the concept to be a reflection of the thing, but then imaginary things like centaurs would have no status of any sort.

             Similarly Sextus deals with truth, refuting first various opinions about its existence, then about its essence, and finally concludes that its location can be found neither in the judgement, nor in verbal expression, nor in the thinking process.

             The result of this detailed investigation shows the ineradicable uncertainty of "truth" and its equally obscure criterion (M VIII, 141ff.). Since anything transcending the sensual apparatus has to be revealed by some indirect evidence, Sextus deals with signs and demonstrations.

             Of non-evident objects, some are altogether non-evident (the number of stars), some are naturally non-evident (pores, evidenced by sweat) and some are occasionally non-evident (Athens to Sextus, writing elsewhere) (P II, 97ff.). The first category (kathapax adela) cannot be apprehended at all, as the stoics will concede. The second (phystei adela) is revealed by indicative signs and the third (pros akairon adela) by commemorative signs. While commemorative, or suggestive, signs are based on observation, and represent associative processes by recalling something temporarily absent from the mind, indicative signs are highly speculative and based on a priori assumptions of a logical nature (M VIII, 152ff.; P II, 102ff.). Far from maintaining "that no sign exists, as some slanderously affirm of us" (M VII, 157), the Skeptics readily infer from smoke that there is fire, and from a scar that there once was a wound, many such instances having been observed to support these connections. Their objections are directed at the indicative sign, which is the only one known in stoic theory.

             The sign in this sense postulates a necessary link between itself and the reality it denotes. Therefore, a sign cannot be conceived of as an absolute; it is by definition part of a relation (M VIII, 273). Like all relative concepts, such as right and left, the sign never is perceived in isolation, but together with the object it refers to. But if they appear together, what need is there for the sign (M VIII, 161ff.)?

             The Epicureans hold the sign to be sensible, the Stoics see it as being of a rational nature. It cannot be sensible, since it is far from the universal acceptance attached to sensually perceived phenomena like warm temperature and bitter taste. Also, if man were equipped with a special sense able to capture these signs, they would be directly perceived and he would not have to put so much effort into learning them. They cannot be rationally dealt with either, as is obvious from countless conflicting interpretations given to a single sign. For example, that the body moves is not necessary nor convincing evidence of the soul. In conclusion, the existence of the sign is doubtful, and its essence, thought to lie in unveiling the unknown, is in great need of revelation itself (M VII, 244ff.).

             If the indicative sign has such a precarious status, it follows that logical demonstrations, consisting of signs and proofs, are similarly problematic, and after long discussion turn out to be totally arbitrary and unintelligible postulates advanced by the Stoics and Epicureans.

             To the accusation that his own explanations are endangered along with the dethronement of the sign and of demonstrations, Sextus replies that they are entirely subjective and that even if they were meant to be proof they would be eliminated along with the argument such as the purgative, or the fire consuming itself with the wood, or a ladder being knocked over once a high place has been reached (M VIII, 480-481).

             In natural philosophy, he discusses God as the universal principle of activity and passivity. The notion of God does not prove his existence, as shown by the example of the Centaur or the Scylla (M IX, 49). The controversy about God's existence becomes even fiercer when it moves on to His possible essence.

             Linked to the active principle is the question of cause and effect (M IX, 194ff.). The Stoics point out the necessity of such a cause in order to explain living and dying, becoming and dissolving. Without such regulative law, chaos would reign everywhere. For the Skeptics, cause is a relative connection (M IX, 208ff.), without existence of its own. Because of this its conceptualization is extremely difficult.

             The principles of agens and patiens are questioned because they imply material contact and change. Both the material and the immaterial essences turn out to be major philosophical problems in themselves and in relation to causes. In particular, the immaterial entities of space and time, movement, number, and quantitative or qualitative change are a source of the wildest speculations.

              In Ethics, Sextus follows the usual distinction of general and applied moralities (ethike theoria, and peri tou bion techne). Everybody is in disagreement about the good to look for and about the bad to avoid. It is obvious that, contrary to the claim of the Stoics and the Epicureans, these moral notions are not implanted by nature, and this conclusion is furthermore supported by their geographical and historical relativity (P III, 198-234; M XI, 96ff.).

             He considers the dogmatic moral theory to be outright harmful, since only wise suspension of judgement is helpful in attaining happiness (M XI, 110ff.). But dogmatic practical ethics are not any more acceptable; they tend to cultivate various vices such as the ruthless pursuit of glory or pleasures. The dogmatic claim of moral philosophy being an art or science is refuted because first of all it lacks a proper subject; secondly, it cannot be taught, which is proven, apart from any theoretical difficulties of instruction, by the discrepancies observed between the dogmatics' own lives and precepts, and thirdly, the rules proposed are of such general nature - one's parents should be honoured, a debt repaid, etc. - that most ignorant people, totally ignorant of moral education, would act accordingly anyway. Finally, in the inability to control the affects and in the efforts to suppress them, dogmatic ethics lead their followers to unhappiness. The immoral giving in to his impulses finds at least some relief (M XI, 210ff.; P III, 273ff.), and momentary happiness.

             The arts and sciences are not in principle useless, as the Epicureans believe. Where Philology is concerned, reading and writing are most useful subjects and an invaluable help in combating forgetfulness. Certain dogmatic attempts, however, discussing the nature and length of vowels, are insubstantial. Nobody has ever agreed on phonetic units, so that diphthongs and long vowels are included in the twenty-four letters of the alphabet, although they are twice as long as other elements (M I, 169ff.). Orthography does not contribute anything necessary for life, and nobody has ever died from misspelling words (M I, 169ff.). Emphasis on the normative rules of "good Greek" are equally silly and more often than not in opposition to current language usage (M I, 175ff.).

             Similar objections are raised against Rhetoric (M II), Geometry (M III), Arithmetic (M IV), Astrology (M V), carefully distinguished from Astronomy which is a useful art based on the close observation of appearances, and finally Music (M VI).

             After Sextus, his disciple and empirical physician Saturninus is the last known representative of Skepticism. He probably was a contemporary of Diogenes Laertius (Brochard, p.328), but is not reputed to have introduced any original elements into the declining Skeptical tradition.

Conclusion

             One last aspect has to be mentioned briefly. It relates to the empirical concept of science and its subsequent influence. Science in the dogmatic sense departs from a priori assumptions and thus has a transcendent or metaphysical basis. Science in Sextus' sense is based on strict observation of the phenomena, and any abstractions within this framework keep their practical orientation and verifiable validity. The Empirical approach, free of metaphysical speculations, is typical for the Skepticism he represents, and has close affinities with modern scientific methods. Deichgräber (p.340-346) devotes an interesting chapter to Bacon, and also draws suggestive parallels with philosophers of his own time, in particular with Vaihinger's Philosophie des Als-Ob (p.280, 345). Brochard (p.310, 360, 375, 378) frequently points out arguments that are still used "today", and notes many similarities with the Positivists of his time, for instance with Renouvier and Claude Bernard (p.372). Speaking of Menodotus (ibid.) whose methods are essentially the same as Sextus', he departs from his usual objective style by giving the following definition: "Sa méthode est celle qui éclaire et féconde l'expérience par le raisonnement, et se défie d'une vaine dialectique sans se borner à amasser des faits. C'est la vraie." Even though he (p.377) sees differences in the use and abuse of dialectics (for the Skeptics only), and in the goal ("purement morale" for the Skeptics, "utilitaire" for the Positivists), he considers the Empiricists as "les véritables ancêtres du positivisme" (p.378).

             Robin (p.298) invokes Auguste Comte and Kant, Pappenheim (Einleitung, p.18) mentions Hegel and Schopenhauer, Richter makes innumerable allusions to modern Skeptics and deals at great length with Montaigne, Hume and Nietzsche. Somewhat more briefly he considers Kant (a partial Skeptic in his eyes), "Aenesidemus" (Gottlob Ernst) Schulze (v.2, p.435) and Platner (v.2, p.439) who both defended a more radical Skepticism and were possibly influenced by Hume. Hegel (Verhältnis, p.213-272) hands out many polemic swipes against "Herrn Schulze", whom he considers much inferior to classical Skeptics. That Hegel has a thorough knowledge of ancient philosophy is obvious throughout this long (60 pages!) book review and also in his lectures (Werke, Bd.19; roughly 500 pages are on Greek philosophy, 170 on Skepticism).

             In his chapter on Positivism (II, p.445-454) Richter mentions next to Comte and Stuart Mill philosophers like Herbert Spencer, Helmholtz, Avenarius and Mauthner. Especially noteworthy are several explicit references to Ernst Mach, who had an enormous influence on the generation of his time. Among other impacts, he can be directly linked to the so-called Sprachkrise in Austrian authors like Hermann Bahr, Hofmannsthal, Schnitzler, Musil and Rilke. But in contemporary literary criticism the filiation or even the really quite striking similarity with Greek Skepticism is not recognized. The very term skepticism seems to be absent from the field of "Germanistik", and phenomena related to this philosophical position are subsumed under names like pessimism, nihilism, negativism, solopsism, etc. The historical perspective never extends beyond Nietzsche (d. 1900!), or at the very utmost, Schopenhauer (d. 1860).

             The abundance of historical links between late nineteenth century philosophers, scientists or literary authors (the latter are mentioned frequently in Richter) and classical Skepticism is probably due to the predominantly diachronic "Zeitgeist" of prestructuralism and Gestalt theory (ca. 1910), but also to the substantial classical education common during that time and sadly missing today. Mach's empirical tendencies are perhaps related to Kant's and Hume's influence only because ancient Skepticism is not well known any longer. It is, however, at least conceivable that Mach had first hand experience with classical Greek texts, including those discussed in the present paper.